Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Birmingham-Southern College
bmyers@panther.bsc.edu
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF ABORTION
General principle: Whether or not a person has a moral obligation to another depends (in part) on how responsible that person is for the other's adverse situation; that is, on the extent to which the other's situation is a consequence of that person's voluntary action. Generally speaking, our moral obligation to another will be stronger (other things being equal) in cases where we are fully responsible than in cases where we are not.
Specific application: Whether or not a woman has a moral obligation to continue her pregnancy depends (in part) on how responsible she is for her being pregnant in the first place; that is, on the extent to which her pregnancy is the consequence of her own voluntary actions. Generally speaking, our moral obligation to continue a pregnancy will be stronger (other things being equal) when the pregnancy was the result of a fully voluntary action, than where (as in Thomson's violinist example) the pregnancy is totally involuntary. But, between these two extremes there is a range of cases where moral judgment is more difficult.
1) Pregnancy caused by rape (totally involuntary). 2) Pregnancy caused by contraceptive failure, where the fault is entirely that of the manufacturer. 3) Pregnancy caused by contraceptive failure within the advertised 1% margin of error (no one's fault). 4) Pregnancy of a young teen who is genuinely ignorant of the consequences of her actions. 5) Pregnancy caused by the negligence of the woman (or the man or both). They are careless in the use of the contraceptive or else fail to use it at all, being unaware of a large risk that they could (ought to?) have been aware of. 6) Pregnancy caused by the deliberate decision of the parties to produce it (completely voluntary).
Adapted from Joel Feinberg's essay, "Abortion," in Matters of Life and Death, ed. Tom Regan.
Latest Update by DLH: March 9 , 1999