From Dr. Doug Browning
(1) The alternatives: (a) God is
(b) God is not
(2) Reason cannot decide between (a) and (b)
(3) But I must accept ("choose") between (a) and (b)
(4) The stakes are
| I accept that God is | I accept that God is not | |
| God is | +infinity - n= +infinity | -infinity + n= -infinity |
| God is not | + 0 - n = -n | - 0 + n = +n |
(5) Therefore, unless one is stupid, he or she will wager on the side of God's existence.
There are, however, several assumptions made by Pascal.
Assumption 1: Acceptance of the existence of God, if God exists, is sufficient for eternal bliss.
Assumption 2: Acceptance of the existence of God will alter one's life to some nth degree in the reduction of ease or happiness, i. e., it involves abstinence, devotion, sacrifice, etc., and it precludes the "poisonous pleasures" of glory and luxury.
Assumption 3: A human being will always prefer and therefore choose (unless he or she is stupid or doesn't understand this proof) that life which provides for his own greatest happiness.
There are also a number of problems with Pascal's wager.
Problem 1, 2, and 3: None of the above assumptions seems clearly true. In fact, it will be said by some that acceptance of the existence of God on a wager will not only not guarantee eternal bliss, but preclude it! Moreover, if I accept that God exists only because it will probably be to my own self-interest to do so, then it seems absurd to think that my acceptance will get me, if God does exist, eternal bliss. Why should it? The second assumption rests upon the notion that one who believes that God exists will live an entirely different kind of life than one who believes that God doesn't exist. But surely a lot of people who believe that God exists lead totally depraved lives and many people who believe that God does not exist lead exemplary lives. Moreover, there seems to be no clear connection between an exemplary life and one of abstinence, devotion (to God), sacrifice, and the avoidance of the pleasures of glory, luxury, sex, food, or whatever. As to assumption 3, it assumes that all humans are ultimately motivated by self-interest or, more narrowly, the pursuit of pleasure. This is, at the very least, questionable.
Problem 4: Though (a) and (b) are contradictories and, therefore, one of them must be true, it is simply not the case that I am forced to accept (a) or (b). The contradictory of
(c) I accept that God is
is not
(d) I accept that God is not
but rather
(e) I do not accept that God is,
which is, of course, perfectly compatible with,
(f) I do not accept that God is not.
Apparently, then, what Pascal has in mind cannot be the alternatives (c) and (d), but either the alternatives (c) and (e) or perhaps something like the alternatives
(g) I believe in God, and
(h) I do not believe in God,
where 'believing in', unlike 'believing that', carries with it the notion of adopting a certain way of life. Otherwise, his argument is incomplete because it leaves out a third alternative.
Problem 5: In any case, it would appear to be false that we can have a belief just because we choose to have it. (This seems true for any sort of belief, certainly for "belief in." We can see that a certain belief would be a "good" one to have or one that we "ought" to have , but it doesn't seem that we then just make ourselves have it. Pascal admits this, but he responds by saying that we can bring ourselves to believe by acting as though we believe. This is of course the way of the hypocrite, the liar, and the con man, not to speak of the psychopath. But of course what Pascal is suggesting is that, if you really and truly want to believe, then you may eventually come to believe , and with God's help you will. Unfortunately, what he suggests that the would-be believer do in order to become a genuine believer are a number of things (taking the holy water, having masses said) which, if not altogether irrelevant, would surely be counterproductive in the lives of most human beings.
Problem 6: And in the end, even if one accepted Pascal's argument, he or she might still refuse to acknowledge that God exists, for such a person might be outraged at the very idea that eternal bliss is available only if one pays the price of being a believer. Such a person might, as Dostoyevsky's underground man, rebel against the idea of being a "piano key," a puppet, a mere object of God's will. Of course, this does not mean that such a person will not believe that God exists; it means only that he or she will also believe that eternal bliss is not worth the cost.
Douglas Browning
Latest Update by DLH: April 11, 1999